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Battaglia: Section 741 and Corn Products: A Logical Extension

SECTION 741 AND CORN PRODUCTS:
A LOGICAL EXTENSION?
INTRODUCTION

In the recent decision of H. Clinton Pollack,' the Tax Court dealt another
blow to the taxpayer in his ongoing struggle to achieve non-capital treatment of
losses on the sale of property. Pollack was a management consultant in a large
firm that permitted its employees to perform outside work if that work did not
conflict with the employer's business. Pollack received an invitation to subscribe
to a limited partnership, Millworth, which was to be formed for the purpose of
rehabilitating troubled businesses. The venture would require the services of
various professionals, including management consultants like Pollack. Pollack
understood that assignments to perform such services would be made among the
limited partners whenever possible. Consequently, the interest Pollack acquired
was in anticipation of receiving a large amount of consulting work. However,
the professional assignments never materialized when the focus of the venture
changed to investment. The Tax Court found that Pollack was not interested
in passive investment 2 and had become a limited partner "solely for the reason
of securing a new source of potential consulting business."3 Realizing that his
objective could not be accomplished, Pollack withdrew from the partnership,
suffering a $27,069.00 loss on the liquidation of his partnership interest.
Pollack took an ordinary deduction, claiming the loss was entitled to treatment either as an ordinary and necessary business expense under section
162(a), 4 or an ordinary business loss under section 165(a).5 Pollack asserted that
such treatment was justified because the partnership interest failed to qualify
as a capital asset under section 1221,6 and because section 7417 notwithstanding,
1.
2.
3.
4.

69 T.C. 142 (1977).
Id. at 144.
Id.
I.R.C. §162. I.R.C. §162 in pertinent part provides:

SEC. 162. Trade or business expenses.
(a) In general -There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business....
5. I.R.C. §165 in pertinent part provides:
SEC. 165. Losses

(a) General rule - There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the
taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(f) Capital losses - Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only
to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212.
6. I.R.C. § 1221 in pertinent part provides:
SEC. 1221. Capital asset defined.
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business) but does not include (1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be
included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or
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the interest was an ordinary asset. Since the issues as posed by Pollack were not
dearly defined, the Tax Court's statement of the issues was quite confused s A
better statement of the position taken by Pollack and treated by the Tax Court
is that although section 741 causes a partnership interest to be a capital asset
under section 1221, a judicial exception to section 1221 treats the interest as an
ordinary asset. In support of the latter contention, Pollack argued that the doctrine of Corn ProductsRefining Co. v. Commissioner9 was applicable.
In opposition to Pollack's claim, the Government contended that section 741
controls the characterization of the loss independent of section 1221 and the
exceptions thereto, and thus capital treatment was required. The Tax Court
viewed the dispositive issues to be whether a sale of a partnership interest

qualifying for capital gain treatment under section 741 must also meet the requirements of section 1221, or whether section 741 characterizes the sale of a

partnership interest independent of section 1221.10
In holding that section 741 was determinative of the characterization without regard to section 1221, the majority did not reach Pollack's argument that
property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depredation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or business;
7. I.R.C. §741 in pertinent part provides:
SEC. 741. Recognition and character of gain or loss on sale or exchange.
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or loss shall be
recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss shall be considered as gain or loss
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751....
Section 741 by definition deals with the sale or exchange of a partnership interest. The
findings of fact, however, state that Pollack's partnership interest was surrendered in
liquidation of the interest. Liquidations are specifically dealt with in Subchapter K by section
736. It is therefore necessary to map out the xoute by which Pollack got from a §736
liquidation to a §741 sale. Section 736(b)(1) must first be looked to in order to determine
what portion of the payment received is to be treated as payment made in exchange for the
partner's interest in partnership property. Implicit in the Pollack facts is that all the payments
received were in exchange for the interest in partnership property which under §736(b) are
to be treated as a distribution by the partnership. Becasue the payments qualified under
§736(b) and were treated as a partnership distribution, the special characterization provisions
of §736(a) were not reached. Distributions by the partnership are in turn controlled by §731.
Generally speaking, where only money is distributed to the partner, as was apparently the
case with Pollack, loss is recognized under §731(a)(2) to the extent of the excess of the
partner's adjusted basis in the partnership interest over the amount of money received. The
flush language of §731(a) provides that the loss so recognized will be treated as a sale or exchange of the partnership interest of the distributee partner. Sales or exchanges of partnership
interest are in turn, as stated above, controlled by §741. See also, 69 T.C. at 144, n.l.
8. 69 T.C. at 145, n.3. The first prong of Pollack's argument was that the interest failed
to qualify as a §1221 capital asset. The second prong was that although §741 calls for capital
treatment, the interest is nonetheless an ordinary asset. The Court seems to combine both
arguments into one. "In support of his position that the interest involved represents an
ordinary asset in his hands [second prong], the petitioner relies upon the judicial exception to
[first prong]." Id.
sec. 1221, I.R.C. 1954, carved out by Corn Products Co. v. Commisioner....
9. 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f9,746 (1955).
10. 69 T.C. at 145.
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the Corn Products doctrine treats the partnership interest as an ordinary
asset.1 The holding is an indication that the Tax Court deemed the Corn
Products doctrine relevant only in determining whether the partnership interest
was a section 1221 capital asset. 12 By holding that section 1221 was not relevant
in characterizing the sale, the court was able to ignore the Corn Productsissue.
To support the independence of section 741 from section 1221, the court
relied upon the origin and purpose of section 741, drawing extensively from the
treatment of partnership interests under prior law and the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of section 74.13 The majority held, two judges dissenting, that the legislative history and the "plain language of the statute,"'' 4
indicate "that Congress intended section 741, if applicable, to provide capital
gain or loss treatment on the sale or exchange of a partnership interest by a
partner without regard to section 1221."'1 The thrust of the decision is that
section 741 exclusively controls the characterization of the sale of a partnership
interest.
Judge Tannenwald's dissent addressed the issue the majority failed to reach
and concluded that the Corn Products doctrine should be applied to partnership interests16 The dissent determined that while section 741 was exclusive of
section 1221, it was not necessarily exclusive of judicial exceptions to capital
asset treatment. In the opinion of the dissenters, the legislative history did not
show Congressional intent contrary to the extension of the Corn Productsdoctrine to section 74 17 and the dissent cited an example of specific Congressional
intent to have the statutory provision exclusively control the characterization
of this sale.' The extention of Corn Products to section 741 was analogized to
the application of the tax benefit doctrine to unambiguous statutory provisions
as authority for creation of a judicial exception to section 74.19
The dissent also viewed the application of the Corn Products doctrine to
section 741 as logical because a partnership interest is an investment similar to
shares of stock or securities to which the doctrine has been widely applied. 20
The dissent reasoned that similar types of investment property should not re-

11. See note 8 supra, and note 15 infra.
12. 69 T.C. at 147, n.7.
13. In their discussion the majority strayed somewhat from the issue at hand by also
going into the origin and purpose of §751, the statutory exclusion from §741 capital asset
treatment. The Government stated at the outset that the §751 statutory exceptions were not
relevant to the case. 69 T.C. at 145. For a discussion of §751, see text accompanying notes 54-60
infra.
14. 69 T.C. at 147.
15. Id. By the omitted footnote, the majority indicated its holding that §741 was controlling to the exclusion of §1221 precluded the court from reaching the question of the applicability of Corn Products to the sale. Thus, there is not a specific holding that Corn
Productsdoes not apply to the sale of a partnership interest.
16. Id. at 147-49. See note 15 supra.
17. 69 T.C. at 148.
18. Id. at 149, n.1.
19. Id. at 149.
20. Id.
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ceive different treatment simply because they are controlled by different statu21
tory provisions, especially where one provision is an outgrowth of the other.

THE SECTION 741/SECTION 1221 DICHOTOMY
The Pollack decision indicates that the threshold issue is the determination
of which statutory provision controls the characterization of the gain or loss
from the sale of a partnership interest. If, contrary to the Tax Court's holding,
a partnership interest must also meet the definitional requirements of section
1221, the characterization issue can be easily disposed of. This is because the
Corn Products doctrine is a well-established exception to the section 1221
definition of a capital asset, as will be seen subsequently. Pollack would thereby
be able to rely upon the Corn Products exception in arguing for non-capital
treatment on the sale of his interest. However, if section 741 is independent of
section 1221 as the Tax Court concluded, extention of the Corn Products doctrine to section 741 would have to be accomplished in the manner suggested by
the dissent.
The legislative history so closely scrutinized by the Tax Court does not
afford a definitive answer to the question of the interrelationship between sections 741 and 1221. It does however lend some support to the Tax Court's conclusion. Congress at the time it enacted the 1954 Internal Revenue Code was
22
well aware of the confusion surrounding the tax treatment of partnerships.
In response to the need for clarification, Congress drafted the "first comprehensive treatment of partners and partnerships ..... 23 The integration of
partnerships into existing statutory patterns had proven unworkable, and Congress created an independent subchapter to deal specifically with the difficulties
posed by the existing law.
Included in the list of areas receiving legislative attention was gain and loss
on the sale of a partnership interest. Alluding to the new section 741, Congress
declared that "a statutory pattern has been established for . . .transfers of
partnership interests by sale ....,24 By providing that gain or loss on the sale
of a partnership interest is to be treated the same as gain or loss on the sale of
a capital asset, Congress constructively provided for a capital asset status that
had theretofore been judicially accomplished by fitting partnership interests
into the definition of a capital asset under the predecessor of section 1221.25
Congress indicated its intent to codify the result reached in the case law decisions: "The general rule that the sale of an interest in a partnership is to be
21. Id. Prior to the 1954 Code, a partnership interest was a capital asset under the predecessor of §1221. See note 25 infra.
22. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CoDe
CONG. & AD. NEws 4091. Congress stated that "[t]he existing treatment of partners and
partnerships is among the most confused in the entire income tax field. The present statutory
provisions are wholly inadequate." Id.
23. Id.

24. Id.
25. For authority that a partnership interest was a capital asset under case law, see, e.g.,

Meyer v. United States, 213 F.2d 278, 1954-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,408 (7th Cir. 1954). The government had previously conceded the issue in G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 C.B. 58.
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treated as the sale of a capital asset is retained." 26 This indicates that Congress
was clearly aware that partnership interests were capital assets under prior law.
27
Under earlier case law, a partnership interest was a capital asset. The statutory provision provided that a partnership interest would be treated as a capital
asset. Thus, although the ultimate treatment was retained, the means of obtaining it were changed. 28 Had it wanted to, Congress could easily have provided that partnership interests are capital assets, retaining their former treatment by bringing them within the ambit of section 1221. However, the choice
by Congress to create a separate statute suggests that section 741 was to be independent of section 1221.
Although the legislative history seems clear, and the Pollack court was unequivocal in its determination that section 741 characterizes the sale of a
partnership interest independent of section 1221, some authority to the contrary
can be mustered. One reason for requiring the sale of a partnership interest to
also meet the requirements of section 1221 is demonstrated by the failure of
section 741 to treat dealers or persons who hold partnership interests primarily
for sale in the ordinary course of their business. Section 741 is silent with regard
to sales of such partnership interests, permitting the conclusion that capital
treatment is appropriate. If the sale of a partnership interest must also meet the
definitional requirements of section 1221, however, non-capital treatment can
be easily obtained by application of the section 1221(1) exclusionary provision.29 There can be little doubt that sales by dealers should not receive
capital treatment, but the proper result cannot be obtained under the statute
8
unless section 741 sales must additionally qualify under section 1221. 0 However, the possibility remains that a judicial exception will characterize such
sales as ordinary.3 1
Judicial authority supporting a dual qualification under sections 741 and
32
1221 is found in dicta in Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport,Inc. One
question before the Court was whether a 1942 Revenue Act amendment adding
34
section 1170) to the 1939 Code"3 affected the definition of a capital asset. In
26. H.R. RaP.
CONG. & AD. NEws

No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE
4096.

27. See, e.g., Meyer v. United States, 213 F.2d 278, 1954-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,408 (7th Cir.
1954). See also, G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 C.B. 58.
28. Had Congress wanted to codify the case law unchanged, it could just as easily have

said that the partnership interest was a capital asset.
29. I.R.C. §1221(1).
30. Indeed, when the Tax Court's holding that §741 characterizes the sale of a partnership interest without regard to §1221, 69 T.C. at 145, is combined with the further holding
that the language "shall be considered" is unambiguous and mandatory on its face, id. at 147,
the ultimate result under the statutes can be no other than such sales are to be treated as
sales of capital assets.

31. See note 30 supra, and the discussion of judicial exceptions to §741 beginning at text
accompanying note 62 infra.
32. 364 U.S. 130, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,556 (1960).
33. INT. REv. COnE oF 1939, §1170) (now I.R.C. §1231). Section 1231 is set forth in note
219 infra.
34. The case involved the proceeds of an award made by the Government for damages to
Gillette caused by the Government seizure of Gillette's trucking business properties during the
Second World War. Gillette claimed the right to use the property was a capital asset. The
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concluding that it did not,3 5 the Court noted that the amendment extended
capital gains treatment to real and depreciable property used in the trade or
business, property which up until that time had been excluded from the definition of a capital asset.36 The Court observed that to provide special capital gains
treatment for property used in the trade or business was the same as removing
one of the exclusions from the definition of a capital asset, and that it therefore "seems evident that 'property used in the trade or business,' to be eligible
for capital gains treatment, must satisfy the same general criteria as govern the
definition of capital assets. ' 37 This language appears to require property used
in the trade or business to meet the definitional requirements of a capital asset
to receive capital gains treatment. Because the same "shall be considered"
language is utilized to grant the constructive capital gains treatment in both
section 741 and the predecessor of section 1231, the statement in Gillette would
be equally applicable to section 741.38 That a partnership interest "must also
satisfy the same general criteria as govern the definition of capital assets"
would then follow. 9
The Gillette dicta does not appear to have gained judicial acceptance. No
court has held that property qualifying under a statutory provision creating
constructive capital gains status must also qualify under the provisions of
section 1221. Moreover, one court directly confronted the issue and declined to
follow the Gillette dicta, stating that the language in Gillette should be limited
to its particular fact situation. 40 The Gillette dicta may find wider acceptance
court ultimately found that the right to use property was not a capital asset, but rather the
equivalent of rent which is ordinary income.

35. 364 U.S. at 134,1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 77,449.
36. INT. Rv.CODE OF 1939, §117(j) (now I.R.C. §1231) provides in pertinent part:

SEC. 117. Capital gains and losses.

(j) Gaines andLosses from Involuntary Conversion...
(2) General rule -If, during the taxable year, the recognized gains upon sales or exchanges of property used in the trade or business, plus the recognized gains from the compulsory or involuntary coversion ... of property used in the trade or business and capital
assets .. ., exceed the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges, and conversions, such
gains and losses shall be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital
assets.... (Emphasis added).

37. 364 U.S. at 134, 1960-2 US. Tax Cas. at 77,449.
38. Compare the §741 language "[s]uch gain or loss shall be considered as gain or loss from
the sale or exchange of a capital asset ... " with the language of INT. REV. CODE OF 1939,
§1176)(2) emphasized in note 86 supra.
Further support for the applicability of the language to §741 can be found in the fact that
unlike §1176)(2) [§1231] property used in the trade or business which had been specifically
excluded from the definition of a capital asset, partnership interests prior to enactment of
§741 had been included in the definition of a capital asset.
39. 364 U.S. at 134, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 77,449.
40. Deltide Fishing Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 1968-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 119,188 (E.D. La. 1968). The court indicated that the Supreme Court in Gillette might
have made the comment it did because under the 1939 Code all provisions dealing with capital
asset treatment were covered under one code section. On the other hand, the court believed
that Congress might have expressed an intent that the provisions should be viewed separately
by placing them in different parts and sections of the code.
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if it is viewed as holding that a statutory provision granting constructive capital
gains treatment should be subjected to the same rules of construction and
interpretation, and possibly the same judicial exceptions, as apply to the definition of a capital asset.4 1 This rationale is problematic, however, if applied in the
context of section 1231 because a conflict arises if section 1231 property is required to meet the section 1221 capital definition. Section 1231 property is
specifically excluded from the definition of a capital asset. 42 A vicious circle
would be created by excluding section 1231 property from section 1221 and
then requiring it to meet the section 1221 prescriptions where it will again be
excluded from the definition of a capital asset. This result could not have been
intended by Congress and lends further support that section 741, which provides for the same constructive capital gains treatment as section 1231, is independent of section 1221.
Although the government 3 and the courts4 4 frequently refer to a partnership interest as a capital asset, this may be an abbreviation for convenience
rather than a conclusion that section 741 partnership interests must also meet
the requirements of section 1221. It is likely that the Tax Court reached the
correct result in Pollack and that section 741 is in fact independent of section
1221. The logical conclusion is that the sales proceeds, after characterization
under section 741, would be taken directly to the operative provisions for their
45
ultimate disposition.
EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION

741

With one of the avenues to ordinary loss treatment foreclosed by the conclusion that section 741 is independent of section 1221, the remaining alternative is to determine whether an exception to section 741 is available. The
dissenting opinion in Pollack concluded that there should be an exception to
the section 741 capital asset treatment,4 6 finding nothing in the legislative history that dictated a contrary resultY This is not true with respect to section
1235, enacted by Congress at the same time it promulgated section 741. Rather,
Congress clearly indicated when it enacted section 1235 that it intended that
constructive capital asset provision to be without exception.48
Section 1235 was included in the Code to deal with the treatment of gain or
loss on the sale of patents. Like section 741, section 1235 is a taxpayer relief
provision providing capital gains treatment for qualifying dispositions. Unlike
in section 741, Congress was explicit in section 1235 in its intent that the latter
41. Decisions interpreting and construing §741 have used cases from the §1221 area for
support. See, e.g., United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff9,136 (5th
Cir. 1963).
42. I.R.C. §1221(2).
43. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-109, 1959-1 C.B. 168.
44. See, e.g., W. D. Holbrook, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 33,432 (1975).
45. For capital gains, I.R.C. §§1201-1202. For capital losses, I.R.C. §§1211-1212.
46. 69 T.C. at 148.
47. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954), reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nzws 4091.
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be the only means by which capital gains treatment could be attained. "This
section provides the only method under the new code whereby the inventor of
a patent can obtain capital gains on its sale. Failure on the part of the seller to
meet its conditions will result... in the entire transaction being taxed to him
as resulting in ordinary income." 49 The quoted language dearly demonstrates
that Congress knew how to express its intent that a statute exclusively controls
the characterization of gain or loss. A similar expression of intent is not found
in the legislative history of section 741. Under the view advanced by the
Pollack dissent, an exception to the provisions of section 741 is possible in the
absence of a specific Congressional directive to the contrary.
A persuasive argument to the contrary is that no inference of any sort can
be drawn from Congress' failure to comment in the legislative history on the
exclusivity of section 741. Congress apparently did not consider the question.
If it had, some mention of its views on the subject would doubtlessly have been
made. Furthermore, an expression of Congressional intent in the section 741
legislative history likely would not be determinative of the issue at hand. In
enacting sections 741 and 1235, Congress was in each case concerned with restricting the means by which preferential capital gains treatment could be
achieved rather than with the possibility of a taxpayer obtaining an ordinary
loss on transactions coming under either of those provisions. References in the
section 1235 legislative history to "capital gains" and "ordinary income" would
lend support to this view.50 That Congress considered the exclusivity of section
741 is unlikely, and that Congress considered the exclusivity of section 741 for
purposes of determining ordinary as opposed to capital loss treatment is even
more doubtful. Without a specific Congressional pronouncement concerning
exceptions to the provisions of section 741, the possibility of obtaining noncapital treatment on the sale of a partnership interest appears to be an open
question which warrants further scrutiny. If an answer to the question can be
found, it will likely be in one of two forms, a statutory exception or a judicial
exception.
Statutory Exceptions
When Congress codified the judicial decisions dealing with the characterization of a sale of a partnership interest, it changed the results reached under the
case law in two respects. As previously noted, partnership interests were no
longer capital assets although they were still treated as assets. Also, Congress
took steps to eliminate a taxpayer device which had arisen as a result of the
case law. Congress recognized that with the advent of capital asset status for
partnership interests had come a device for converting ordinary income into
capital gain. 51 By selling an interest in a partnership that had rights to payment
for goods or services that would be includible in income, or that had potential
49.
CONG.

50.
51.
CONG.

H.R. Rm,. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S.

CoDE

& AD. Nzws 4422.
See the quoted legislative history accompanying note 49 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S.

CODE

&AD. NEws 4091.
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income in the form of inventory items with a value substantially in excess of
basis, ordinary income could be converted into capital gain. Congress referred
to this device as a "collapsible partnership." 52 To prevent the continuation of
such abuses, Congress added section 751 to the new Subchapter K .1
Section 751 provides in part for a statutory exception to the capital gains
treatment provided by section 741.54 Where there are rights to receive income
for goods or services, 5 or where there are inventory items56 which have appreciated substantially in value' 7 payment received for such property will be
treated as the amount realized from the sale or exchange of property other than
5
a capital asset,1
or, stated another way, as ordinary income.5 Thus, Congress
carved out a specific statutory exception to the capital gains treatment of section 741 and thereby demonstrated an intent to exclude from capital gains
treatment items or potential items of ordinary income which arise in the
ordinary course of the partnership business. 60 However, section 751 characterizes only a part of the partnership interest as ordinary, the balance of the
interest being accorded capital gain treatment. Section 751 might therefore be
regarded as only a partial exception to section 741.
A strong argument can be made that section 751 was the only exception to
section 741 intended by Congress. But if that was its intent, Congress definitely
did not express it. As with the question of the exclusivity of section 741, the
only conclusion to be drawn from the lack of a congressional comment on the
matter should be that Congress probably did not consider it. No other statutory provision has been enacted which specifically preempts section 741, nor has
any court held that another statute overrides section 741. However, an analogy
can be drawn to cases which have held that a statute providing for a deduction
from gross income will override the section 1221 definition of a capital asset.6 1
52. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEws 4731.
53. Id.
54. I.R.C. §751(a).
55. I.R.C. §751(c).
56. I.R.C. §751(d)(2). Generally speaking all property other than §1221 capital assets or
§1231 property used in the trade or business.
57. I.R.C. §751(d)(1).
58. I.R.C. §751(a).
59. See I.R.C. §64, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which defines ordinary income.
There is no explanation why §751 did not incorporate the ordinary income language inserted by amendment into other sections. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§1245(a)(1) & 1250(a)(1)(A).
60. H.R. RP'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4097. The §751(d) provision dealing with potential income lurking in inventory, taxes as oritinary income the gain which has not been realized. On the other hand,
the rights to income for goods sold or services performed has been realized although recognized by a cash basis taxpayer. While Congress intended to prevent arrangement to convert
ordinary income into capital gain, it was not disposed toward preventing the conversion of
ordinary loss. Thus in S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4732, it was noted that Congress removed substantially depreciated inventory from the class of assets receiving special treatment under §751.
61. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
§9,381 (2d Cir. 1955); Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955), acquiesced in,
1958-1 C.B. 6.
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Whether the same statutory provisions will also override a constructive capital
asset provision such as section 741 remains an open question.
JudicialExceptions
That section 741 controls the characterization of a sale of partnership interest to the exclusion of section 1221 appears to be an accurate statement of
the law. However, to say that section 741 controls characterization to the exclusion of any other body of law is a totally different proposition. Quite often
judicial doctrines have created exceptions to,6 2 or have deviated from, 63 the
literal statutory language of a wide variety of Code provisions.
In Pollack, the court held that "congressional use of the phrase 'shall be
considered as' in section 741 is unambiguous and mandatory on its face." 8'
The use of the term "mandatory" suggests that the court believed that not only
was section 741 exclusive of section 1221 in its operation, but also that section
741 was exclusive of all judicial doctrines as well. The legislative history of
section 741 does not indicate that such a result was intended by its enactment.
To the contrary, the stated purpose was to clear up the confusion existing in
the partnership area 5 and to codify the existing case law dealing with the sale
of partnership interests. e
If the statutory language of section 741 is to be mandatory, as the Pollack
court held, such language should be regarded as mandatory in prescribing that
the sale or exchange qualify under section 741 in order to receive the favorable
capital gains treatment, not that capital gains treatment must necessarily follow
the sale of a partnership interest. Furthermore, whether the language was intended to be mandatory at all is questionable. The purpose of the statutory
provisions that grant capital gain treatment is to provide relief to taxpayers 6 7
Such provisions remove excessive tax burdens caused by gains from conversions
of property that has appreciated over a long period of time.68 Bearing in mind
that Congress is granting a benefit to taxpayers, Congress probably intended to
limit the favorable treatment to hardships rather than requiring that the benefit accrue in all situations regardless of the need for taxpayer relief. The case
law supports this view.69 In determining whether a taxpayer comes within the
62. See, e.g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9,746 (1955).

63. Judicial doctrines have developed to create a different tax treatment than would have
resulted under a literal reading of the pertinent statutes. See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.,
356 U.S. 260, 1958-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 29,428 (1958) (substance over form); Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 29,215 (1945) (step-transaction doc.
trine); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,787 (1940) (assignment of

income doctrine).
64. 69 T.C. at 147.

65. See note 22 supra.
66. See note 26 supra.
67. See H.R. Rm,. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1954), reprintedin [1954] 3 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD.NEws 4091.
68. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
ff9,556 (1960); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 1933 U.S. Tax Cas. 990 (1932).

69. See, e.g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9,746 (1955).
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capital gains provisions, courts frequently note that "the definition of a capital
asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted broadly."70 And,
as will be demonstrated, this language has found application in situations involving the sale of a partnership interest.
A reasonable assumption is that Congress expected the same judicial doctrines that apply to the other capital gains provisions also to apply to section
741.71 Yet, the Tax Court indicated in Pollack that it had previously assumed
that section 741 exclusively controlled the characterization of the sale of a
partnership interest. One case cited in support of this proposition was Daniel
Coven.7 2 Upon retirement from an accounting partnership, Coven entered into
a "consulting agreement" with the continuing partner. The agreement provided for payments for the duration of Coven's life, and upon his death payments to his spouse if she survived. The survivor's estate was to receive a progressively decreasing lump sum payment if neither of them lived until 1991.
At issue was whether the "consulting agreement" constituted a liquidation of a
partnership interest under section 73673 or a sale of a partnership interest under
section 741. In determining that the "consulting agreement" was in substance a
sale, the Tax Court held that section 741 was applicable, and Coven thus
qualified for capital gains treatment.7 4 The court addressed the liquidation-sale
dichotomy that has been the subject of litigation in the past.7 5 Rather than

suggesting that section 741 is assumed to be exclusive or mandatory in the
characterization of a sale of a partnership interest, the decision demonstrates
that under normal circumstances, capital gains treatment is the usual statutory
result on the sale of a partnership interest. No attempt was made to deviate
from the literal language of the statute, and Coven therefore could not provide
authority that there are no judicial exceptions to section 741.76
70. Id. at 52.
71. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
72. 66 T.C. 295 (1976), acquiesced in, 1976-2 C.B. I.
73. See note 26 supra. Although the mechanical operation of §§736 and 741 are beyond
the scope of this article, it is important to note that in certain circumstances the determination of which section applies can mean the difference between a portion of the amount received being treated as ordinary income rather than capital gain. In Pollack such circumstances
were not present so that §736 ultimately had no effect on the liquidation. However, in other
situations the consequences can vary dramatically depending on which provision applies.
74. 66 T.C. at 303.
75. Foxman v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 466, 1965-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,737 (3rd Cir. 1965);
William J. Cooney, 65 T.C. 101 (1975).
76. Another example of the presumed capital gain treatment in an ordinary sales situation is Martin Goldfield, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) f28,495 (1967). In that case, the taxpayer con.
sidered the sale of a partnership interest to be a sale of each of the underlying assets, and
determined the gain to be capital or ordinary based on the nature of each asset. This is an
"aggregate" theory which is consistent with notions underlying the sale of a proprietorship.
See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 1946-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff9,120 (2d Cir. 1945). The underlying theory of §741, however, is an "entity" approach meaning the interest is a property
interest in itself separate from the various underlying assets. The Tax Court properly observed "[W]e agree with petitioners that under section 741, I.R.C. 1954, the amount received
upon the sale of a partnership interest held for more than six months is to be taxed as capital
gain." 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 128,495.
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Another case which the Tax Court cited in Pollack for its presumed mandatory or exclusive treatment under section 741 was W. D. HolbrookY The taxpayers, Holbrook and Childers, purchased limited partnership interests in an
oil and gas business. Although both Holbrook and Childers had made additional capital contributions to the partnership, operating losses resulting in tax
deductions to the taxpayers had reduced the basis78 in the partnership interests
almost to zero. Several years after their original acquisition, both taxpayers
transferred their interests at a gain to an unrelated individual in exchange for
promissory notes. Holbrook's note was satisfied that same year by reduction of
business accounts owed by Holbrook to the obligor, plus payment of a small
cash amount. Childers received cash payments under the terms of the note in
each of the succeeding two years.
The taxpayers contended that they were entitled to capital gains treatment
under section 741 by virtue of the sale of their partnership interests. The Commissioner countered that the amount realized in excess of their basis in the
partnership interests was a recovery of operating losses which should be treated
as ordinary income under tax benefit principles. The Tax Court concluded that
tax benefit principles were not applicable to the sale of a partnership interest
and declined to extend the doctrine to section 741. The Court pointed out that
the rule applies in situations where the same item which has previously been
expensed is subsequently recovered.- The Court in Holbrook found that the
identical item had not been recovered. "The recovery, if it be called that, is of
the investment, a capital asset, not of the losses."so The court considered the
sale to be of a capital asset; that is, an investment which has appreciated over
time in keeping with the principles of Gillette Motor Transport,Inc.81 While
the case alludes to the partnership interest as a capital asset,82 the significance of
the decision lies in the Tax Court's refusal to create a judicial exception to
section 741 capital asset treatment.
The holding in Holbrook supports the Tax Court's conclusion in Pollack
that the provisions of section 741 are inviolable. Moreover, the Holbrook
opinion undermines one of the stronger arguments advanced in the Pollack
dissent. Judge Tannenwald used the tax benefit rule as evidence of the Court's
willingness to apply general legal principles to override statutory provisions
that are regarded as specific and unequivocal. To support the proposition that
a judicial exception, the Corn Products doctrine, should be applied to section
741, an analogy was drawn to the widespread application of the tax benefit
rule. However, Judge Tannenwald inadvertently weakened his own argument
when he qualified his analysis: "While I recognize that the Corn Products
77. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) f33,432 (1975).
78. See I.R.C. §705(a)(2)(A).
79. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 33,432 (1975).
80. Id. at 1286.
81. 364 U.S. 130, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,556 (1960).
82. Note that like Rev. Rul. 59-109, 1959-1 C.B. 168, the investment in the partnership
interest is termed a capital asset, not that it is treated like a capital asset. This language again
raises the question of whether §1221 is called into play when treating the partnership interest

as a capital asset. But see text accompanying notes 43 and 44 supra.
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doctrine may not have the pervasive applicability of the tax benefit rule, there
is at least a useful analogy between the two principles as far as the instant case
is concerned."8 13 With the Tax Court demonstrating in Holbrook that the tax
benefit rule will not be applied to section 741, Judge Tannenwald's analogy
defeats his argument. Because the Tax Court has ruled that it will not apply
the pervasive tax benefit rule to section 741, application of the less pervasive
Corn Products doctrine to that provision is even more unlikely. While some
legal principles presumably can apply to a statutory provision even though
other principles will not,84 Holbrook tends to support the Tax Court's assumption that section 741 exclusively characterizes the sale of a partnership interest.
Capital asset treatment of section 741 has not been totally free from challenge, however. The Government frequently attempts to deny taxpayers the
relief of section 741 by arguing that the transaction was not a sale or exchange,
thereby obtaining non-capital treatment by totally avoiding the provisions of
section 741. In tandem with this argument, the service usually urges a narrow
definition of the capital gain provision of section 741 and a broad interpretation of the section 751 statutory exclusions from capital gain treatment.
This theory is demonstrated in United States v. Woolsey.85 Woolsey involved the sale of an interest in a partnership owning as its principal asset a
contract to manage a mutual insurance company. The Fifth Circuit held that
the contract was an unrealized receivable 8o requiring treatment as ordinary income under section 751.11
The importance of the decision is not so much the holding as the reasoning
employed to reach it. The court cited Hort v. Commissioner,8 Corn Products
and Gillette Motor Transport, Inc.89 to support its determination that the
definition of a capital asset is to be narrowly construed and defined, and that
the term capital asset represents appreciation of an asset over a period of time.90
Noting that there are numerous exclusions from and exceptions to the definition of a capital asset, the court again cited Corn Products,this time to support
88.
84.
85.
86.
Sec.

69 T.C. at 149.
E.g., the tax benefit rule had not been applied to §1221.
326 F.2d 287, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,136 (5th Cir. 1963).
I.R.C. §751(c) provides in pertinent part:
751. Unrealized receivables and inventory items

(c) Unrealized receivables -For purposes of this subchapter, the term "unrealized receivables" includes, to the extent not previously includable in income under the method of
accounting used by the partnership, any rights (contractual or otherwise) to payment for (1) goods delivered, or to be delivered, to the extent the proceeds therefrom would
be treated as amounts received from the sale or exchange of property other than a
capital asset, or
(2) services rendered, or to be rendered.
87. 326 F.2d at 291, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 91,257. The court did not have any trouble
fitting the contract into the §751(c) definition of an "unrealized receivable," relying on the
language "any rights (contractual or otherwise) to payment for .
(2) services rendered, or
to be rendered." Id. (Emphasis added).

88. 313 U.S. 28, 1941-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,354 (1941).
89. 364 U.S. 130, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,556 (1960).
90. 326 F.2d at 290, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 91,257.
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a broad construction of such exclusions and exceptions. 91 The opinion dearly
indicates that section 741 in providing constructive capital asset status will be
construed and applied consistent with the definition of a capital asset under
section 1221.92 Moreover, the decision demonstrates that sections 741 and 1221
have a common objective which subjects them to the same judicial principles
of interpretation and construction.
In the same year, the Ninth Circuit used identical reasoning to reach a
result similar to that in Woolsey.93 In Roth v. Commissioner,94 at issue was the
sale of an interest in a partnership that owned exclusive distribution rights for
a motion picture. The taxpayer's law firm transferred its interest in the partnership to a corporation in return for specified payments over a period of years.
The amount of these payments was simply the amount the corporation was to
receive from the partnership. The payments from the corporation were to continue for seven years, with a lump sum payment at the end of seven years representing the residual value of the distribution agreement which would have
almost three years left to run. As in Woolsey, the court held that there was no
sale of a partnership interest because the transaction lacked economic substance.' 5
The court added that even if there had been a sale, section 751 would cause
the amount realized attributable to the distribution contract to be characterized
as ordinary income.96 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Woolsey, here a more difficult task of fitting the distribution contract into the definition of unrealized
receivablesP 7 was presented. In opting for a broad reading of the exclusionary
provisions of section 751, the court referred to the rule in Corn Products that
the definition of a capital asset is to be narrowly construed and the exclusions
from its reach are to be broadly interpreted.98
Both Woolsey and Roth accomplish the congressional purpose of preventing
conversion of ordinary income into capital gain within the confines of the
statutory provisions, although not always comfortably. Both cases involved unsuccessful attempts to assign future income and benefit from capital gain treatment at the time of assignment. 99 Because congressional intent was dear with
91. Id., 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 91,257.

92. The court did not say that §741 is to also satisfy the definitional requirements of
§1221. It is saying that the two statutes have the same objective of taxpayer relief and are to
satisfy the same congressional purpose of relieving the burden resulting from taxing in one
year the property appreciation accumulated over several years.
93. Roth v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 607, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,656 (9th Cir. 1963).
94. Id., 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 89,638.
95. Id. at 609-10, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 89,640. In support for the rule that substance of
the transaction must control over form, the court cited Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356
U.S. 260, 1958-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,428 (1968).
96. 321 F.2d at 610, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 89,640.
97. Id., 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 89,640. "It may be conceded that the partnership right to

payments under the Paramount distribution contract does not fall clearly within the definition of the term 'unrealized receivables."' Id., 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 89,640.
98. Id. at 610-11, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 89,640.
99. See also, Herman Glazer, 44 T.C. 541 (1965) with the same result, where an interest in
a partnership owning 24-80% completed houses, all of which were under contract for sale, was

purportedly sold with a contemporaneous agreement with the purchaser, the taxpayer's at-
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regard to conversion of ordinary income into capital gain,100 use of section 751
was preferable to avoid a deviation from the statutory provisions.
However, courts have not been able to stay within the confines of the
statutes in every case where a purported sale of a partnership interest was
utilized to assert capital gain treatment for an anticipatory assignment of income. In Herman M. Hale1°' the Tax Court denied capital gains treatment to
the sale of a partnership interest despite the fact that the transaction could not
be brought within the statutory exceptions of section 751. The Hale Company
(Hale Co.) was a limited partnership which contracted for and completed the
purchase of a parcel of real estate. The property was subsequently deeded to
the Walnut Company, Ltd. (Walnut Co.), a limited partnership in which Hale
Co. was a general partner. Walnut Co. had been formed to develop the real
estate into single-family dwellings. Hale Co. received its interest in Walnut
Co.'s future profits in return for past and future services.102 A contract for sale
of 90 percent of Hale Co.'s partnership interest in Walnut Co. was subsequently
entered into at a time when Walnut Co. held 3 lots and Ill completed houses,
39 of which were subject to contracts for sale.10 3 The purchaser, a corporation
owned equally by the attorney and accountant for Walnut Co., was found by
torney, to complete the houses. The Tax Court held that the substance of the transaction was
not a sale. Id. at 545-46. Moreover, if the transaction was a sale, the contracts for sale represented unrealized receivables within the definition of §751(c) and were therefore taxable as
ordinary income, 44 T.C. at 547.
100. H.R. REP'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. Naws 4091.
101. 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 27,590 (1965).
102. Id. The facts are ambiguous as to what type interest Hale Co. had in, and what type
contribution it made to, Walnut Co. The facts recite that "Hale Co. received its partnership
interest in Walnut Co. in exchange for its contribution of services, past and future, thereto."
Id. at 1500. Yet no mention is made of the consideration that Hale Co. received from Walnut
Co. in exchange for the Storey property. It is possible that the Storey property was a capital
contribution; if it was a sale, no mention was made of that fact in the findings. Subsequent
discussion concerning the sale at issue in the case indicate that Hale Co. had both a capital
and profits interest. The factual recitation states that "the Walnut Co.'s partnership agreement . . . was further amended to ratify the assignment by Hale Co. of 90 percent of its
partnership interest in Walnut Co., including 90 percent of its interest in Walnut Co.'s
profits and 90 percent of its interest in Walnut Co.'s capital ....
" Id. at 1501. (Emphasis
aoded). With reference to the agreement for the sale of 90% of Hale Co.'s partnership interest
to D-K Investment Corporation (D-K), the purchaser, the findings of fact state the "agreement
... provided that in consideration of the payment by D-K to Hale Co. of $125,000, Hale Co.
would transfer to D-K 90 percent of Hale Co.'s partnership interest in Walnut Co., which
interest expressly included 90 percent of Hale Co.'s interest in Walnut Co.'s profits and
capital." Id. In the opinion the court again stated that an interest in future profits was received, but this time it states that the consideration given was future services only. A footnote
suggests that a receipt of an interest in future profits does not create any tax liability, and the
sale of such an interest should be treated as capital gain. See Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,686 (9th Cir. 1960); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454, 1943-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f9,565 (8th Cir. 1943). See also, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 1937-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff9,083 (1937). A different question is raised where a
profit share is received as compensation. See Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 1974-1
U.S. Tax Cas. f9,306 (7th Cir. 1974).

103.

24 T.C.M. (CCH) 27,590 (1965).
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the Tax Court to be a "viable entity."' '.4 Implicit in this finding is the notion
that the transaction had economic substance,10 5 precluding an argument like
that advanced in Roth that there had not been a sale of a partnership interest.
Unlike in Woolsey and Roth, the court was unable to bring the houses
within the definition of "unrealized receivables"10 6 because not all the houses
were under contract for sale, and thus the partnership did not have a right to
10 7
income for goods or services rendered for all the partnership properties. The
only remaining manner in which section 751 could apply was if the inventory of
houses was "substantially appreciated inventory."108 However, the houses did
not fit the definitional requirements of section 751(d), thereby precluding the
characterization of the sale under section 751.109
Undaunted by the lack of a statutory ground to deny capital gain treatment,
Judge Fay carved out a judicial exception to the section 741 capital gains pro110
vision, basing his decision on notions of anticipatory assignment of income.
The purposes of section 1221111 were (1) "to relieve the taxpayer from
*.. excessive burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments," and (2) "to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on
such conversions." See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260
(1958). This exception has always been narrowly construed. See Corn
ProductsCo. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).112
The court enunciated in one sentence the rationale for every denial of
capital gains treatment: "We do not see here any conversion of a capital in-

104. Id. Cf. Herman Glazer, 44 T.C. 541 (1965) (all the houses under contract and thus

unrealized receivables).
105. This precludes the "economic substance over form argument." See, e.g., Herman
Glazer, 44 T.C. 541 (1965).
106. I.R.C. §751(c).
107. See note 100 supra.
108. I.R.C. §751(d) provides in pertinent part:

SEC. 751. Unrealized receivables and inventory items.
(d) Inventory items which have appreciated substantially in value (1) Substantial appreciation -Inventory items of the partnership shall be considered to

have appreciated substantially in value if their fair market value exceeds (A) 120 percent of the adjusted basis to the partnership of such property, and

(B) 10 percent of the fair market value of all partnership property, other than money.
(2)Inventory items - For purposes of this subchapter the term "inventory items" means (A) property of the partnership of the kind described in section 1221(1),

(B)any other property of the partnership which, on sale or exchange by the partnership, would be considered property other than a capital asset and other than property
described in section 1231....

109. In short, the houses did not meet the requirement of §751(d)(1)(A) that the fair
market value exceed 120o of the property's adjusted basis to the partnership. The fair market
value was found to be $1,484,550, the adjusted basis $1,286,333.68, 120% of the property's adjusted basis is $1,543,601. Obviously $1,484,400 does not exceed $1,543,601.
110. 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 127,590 (1965).
111. See note 92 supra.
112. 24 T.C.M. (CCII) V27,590 (1965).
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vestment. ""'1 Thus, the Tax Court in Hale has demonstrated that where the
partnership interest represents income generated in the ordinary course of
partnership business, such income is not an investment and will not be accorded
capital gain treatment. Not only will this be the result in the absence of statutory authority, but it will also obtain even though the holding does violence to
the specific statutory language.
The cited cases, culminating with Holbrook, suggest several conclusions.
First, the same rules of construction and interpretation that apply to section
1221 also apply to section 741's constructive capital asset treatment. Similarly,
the same judicial exceptions may possibly be applied to statutes providing constructive capital asset status. Second, not only has the sanctity of section 741's
"mandatory" capital asset treatment been violated, but the Tax Court was the
one to violate it. While the tax benefit rule has not been applied to section 741,
this is consistent with subjecting section 741 to the same judicial principles as
section 1221, to which the tax benefit rule also has not been applied. As they
have been applied to section 1221, the anticipatory assignment of income principles have likewise been applied to section 741, creating a specific judicial
exception to the statute. Furthermore, to expect that an exception to section
741 capital asset treatment would be created for dealers in partnership interests
who sell the interests in the ordinary course of their business is reasonable.
Thus the Hale decision and logic appear to indicate that the Tax Court was
erroneous in concluding that the operation of section 741 was "mandatory."
T- E CORN PRODUCTS DOCTRINE

If there are judicial exceptions to section 741, the question remains whether
the Corn Products doctrine should be applied to the sale of a partnership
interest, as the Pollack decision suggests. In order to answer this question, the
Corn Products doctrine must first be examined and traced to its current status.
In Corn Products,11 4 the taxpayer purchased corn futures as protection

against price increases caused by shortages of spot corn. If the supply available
on the open market was adequate to meet production needs, the futures were
sold. If there was a shortage, delivery was taken. Corn Products originally reported the profits realized on the sale of its futures as ordinary income from its
manufacturing operations. The derivation of Corn Products' treatment of its
profits came from United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange,
Inc.," 5 which had separated futures transactions into three groups:
Those who deal in quotes are divided into three classes: First those
who use them to hedge, i.e. to insure themselves against loss by unfavorable changes in price at the time of actual delivery of what they have to
113. Id. It is ironic that the Judge Fay, who created an exception to §741 in Hale citing
Corn Products as authority for a narrow interpretation, would subsequently hold that there
are no judicial exceptions to §741 and deny application of the Corn Products doctrine to the
statute.
114. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395 (1951), af'd, 215 F.2d 513,
1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 2166,082 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,746.
115. 263 U.S. 611 (1924).
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sell or buy in their business; second legitimate capitalists who, exercising
their judgment as to the conditions, purchase or sell for future delivery
with a view to profit based on the law of supply and demand; and third
gamblers or irresponsible speculators who buy or sell as upon the turn of
a card. 116

G.C.M. 17322 discusses tax treatment of transactions of the first category hedging transaction - by elaborating on the language dealing with insurance.
if contracts are entered into to insure against risks due to price fluctuations and
assure ordinary operating profits, losses from the hedging transactions are to be
treated as a legitimate form of business insurance deductible as an ordinary
and necessary expense. Gains from the transaction are treated as net income
from compensation for adverse price fluctuations.18s
Corn Products, in attempting to reverse its earlier position, argued that its
transactions were not true hedges because the business was protected only
against upward price fluctuations and not against a decrease in prices. Corn
Products contended that it was not hedging or speculating but rather was dealing in the market as a "legitimate capitalist," 11 9 and thus the gains were entitled to capital treatment. The Tax Court, while acknowledging that the
transaction did not fit within the definition of a hedge, held that the futures
purchased were "an integral part of its manufacturing business."120
In affirming,'12 the Second Circuit held that a hedge is the equivalent of an22
inventory item and as such is excluded from the definition of a capital asset.
The Supreme Court concluded2 a that Corn Products was not a legitimate
capitalist and approved the lower courts' determinations that the futures
transactions were "an integral part of its business designed to protect its
manufacturing operations against a price increase .... "124 The Court set forth
what is now recognized as the foundation of the Corn Products doctrine:
"Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday operation
116.

Id. at 619.

117. XV-2 C.B. 151 (1936).
118. Id. at 152.
119. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395 (1951). See 1955-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 119,746.
120. 11 T.C.M. (CCH) f19,093 (1952). The "integral part" was derived from Ben Grote,
41 B.T.A. 247 (1940) where the Board held that hedging activities were for protection against

price fluctuations and were related to the production business.
121. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 513, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
166,082 (2nd Cir. 1954).
122. Id. at 516, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 47,170. The Court elaborated on the Tax Court's
holding by stating that a hedge "is an integral part of the productive process in which the
property is held not for investment but for the protection of profit with the intent of disposition when that purpose has been achieved." Id., 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 47,170. The court was
of the opinion that in such circumstances the transactions were in all respects the same as a
hedge.
123. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
19,746 (1955).

124. Id. at 50, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 56,063. The Court acknowledged that contrary to
the Second Circuites holding, the hedging transactions were not within the exclusions from
the definition of a capital asset.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss1/3

18

Battaglia: Section 741 and Corn Products: A Logical Extension
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.XXX

of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain
or loss. The preferential treatment provided by §117 [now §1221] applies to
' 25
transactions in property which are not the normal source of business income."'
The Source of Supply Cases
Corn Products did not create the first exception to the provisions of section
1221. In fact, non-capital treatment had been allowed on several occasions
prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Corn Products.
One of the first cases to lay a foundation for the Corn Products doctrine
was Western Wine & Liquor Co.,' 26 a "source of supply"' 27 case. Earlier decisions12 1 had strictly adhered to the definition of capital assets, disallowing
ordinary deductions for securities acquired in order to obtain a source of materials. However, in Western Wine the loss realized on the sale of American
Distilling Co. securities which entitled the shareholder to purchase a proportionate amount of the American Distilling's liquor inventory was held not to be
a capital asset.' 29 The court reasoned that the premium paid for the stock represented the value of the liquor purchase rights, which could be part of the
cost of goods sold. Rather than allowing the loss as a business expense or a loss,
however, the court elasticized the exclusion from the capital asset definition by
holding the stock "was property held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business and was not a capital asset.' 3 0 The court used a
125. Id. at 52, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 56,064. The decision has been severely criticized for
creating a judicial exception to an explicit statutory provision. See the articles collected in
Kauffman, A Second Look at the Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAXEs 605, 607 (1963). The
regulations indicate that property not specifically excluded from the definition found in §1221
of a capital asset constitutes a capital asset. TREAs. REG. §1.1221-1(a), T.D. 7369, 1975-2 C.B.
335. Likewise, the legislative history leaves little doubt that Congress intended property to be a
capital asset unless it fell under one of the specific exclusions from the definition.
H.R. REp. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1934). This legislative history deals with §117 of
the 1939 Code, predecessor of the present day §1221. Nonetheless, the doctrine has continued vitality and widespread application.
The numerous law review articles on Corn Products are evidence enough that the doctrine is a constant source of litigation. Representative, but by no means exhaustive are:
Cunnane, Acquiring Capital Items for Non-Capital Purposes, or When Is a Capital Asset Not
a Capital Asset?, 29 N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX 705 (1971); Javaras, Corporate Capital
Gains and Losses- The Corn Products Doctrine, 52 TAXES 770 (1974); Kauffman, A Second
Look at the Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAXES 605 (1963); LeMaster, Corporate Securities
Losses: Is Corn Products Now Irrelevant?, 3 J. CORP. TAx 141 (1976); Rabinovitz & Shashy,
Properties of Property -Indigestion from Corn Products, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 964 (1975);
Troxell & Noall, Judicial Erosion of the Concept of Securities as Capital Assets, 19 TAX L.
REv. 185 (1964); Note, Taxpayer Motivation and the Corn Products Doctrine, 29 TAX LAw.
660 (1976).
126. 18 T.C. 1090, appeal dismissed on Commissioner's motion, 205 F.2d 420 (1952).
127. See LeMaster, supra note 125, at 144-48.
128. Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 283, 1947-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
§9,318 (2d Cir. 1947); Logan & Kanawha Coal Co., 5 T.C. 1298 (1945).
129. 18 T.C. at 1099. A better statement might have been that the premium paid for the
stock comprised a part of the property held primarily for sale. See also, Troxell & Noall, supra
note 125, at 188.
130. 18 T.C. at 1099.
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step transaction approach 131 to find that the purchase of the stock at a

premium, 132 purchase of the liquor, and sale of the stock was a single transaction which was the equivalent of an additional amount paid for the cost of
goods sold.2 3 The manner in which the Tax Court in Western Wine brought
the stock within one of the exclusions from section 1221 was much the same as
the Second Circuit's approach in Corn Products.3 4 Both courts strained the
statutory language to prevent doing violence to the provision, much like the
courts have done with section 751.135
The Second Circuit was again faced with the question of non-capital treatment in Commissioner v. The Bagley and Sewell CoY' e However, this time the
property could not be fitted within one of the section 1221 exclusions. In
Bagley, the taxpayer was required to deposit certain United States Government
Bonds as security for the performance of a contract with the Finnish Government. Funds were borrowed to purchase the bonds which were promptly sold at
a loss upon release from escrow. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision
that the bonds were held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business
and that the loss was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 1 7 But, because the statute could not be stretched quite far enough for
the court to find that the bonds were held primarily for sale in the ordinary
course of business within the exclusionary provisions of section 1221(1), the
deduction was allowed as an ordinary and necessary business expense by
analogy to the exclusion which it most closely resembled.13 The opinion
equated the loss on the bonds to the ordinary business expense incurred for a
surety bond premium. 3 9 The court noted that there had been earlier cases
131. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74, aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
132. See Chase Candy Company v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 521, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
ff9,703 (Ct. Cl. 1954), where the premium on the purchase of stock was held to be a capital
outlay to be recouped from profits over a period of time.
133. 18 T.C. at 1096. For a more explicit application of Kimbell-Diamond, see Pressed
Steel Car Co., 20 T.C. 198 (1953). There a corporation holding as its sole asset a disputed contract was acquired and promptly liquidated to settle the dispute. Ordinary and necessary business expense or ordinary loss was allowed to the taxpayer.
The substance over form rationale has been applied to the sale of partnership interests. See
United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,136 (5th Cir. 1963), Roth v.
Commissioner, 321 F.2d 607, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,656 (9th Cir. 1963). The same is true of
the step transaction doctrine. See Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472, 1971-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
19,698 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
134. 215 F.2d at 516, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 66,082.
135. See, e.g., Roth v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 607, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,656 (9th Cir.
1963).
136. 221 F.2d 944, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,381 (2d Cir. 1955).
137. Id. at 946, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,381 at 54,883.
138. Id. at 947, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f9,381 at 54,884. See also Judge Frank's dissent, id.
at 947, 950, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,381 at 54,885. The Tax Court has recently expressed an
inclination to restrict Corn Products to situations which closely approximate, though do not
qualify under, one of the statutory exclusions. W.W. Windle Co., 65 T.C. 694, 713 (1976),
appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977).
139. 221 F.2d at 947, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 54,884. The court seemed to say that the
substance of the transactions was not an investment but rather the acquisition of property held
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which indicate "that business expense, Section 23140 [now §162] has been many
times determined by business necessity 141 without a specific consideration of
Section 117142 [now § 1221],"' 143 although the court specifically declined to follow

those earlier decisions. 44 Thus, although the expense was not in the customary
form, it was nonetheless a reasonable means to satisfy the requirements of
section 162. Bagley could be said to stand for the proposition that the provisions of section 162 will characterize a loss as ordinary by overriding the
section 165 loss provisions, although the court declined to follow earlier cases
which explicitly so held.
The Tax Court subsequently adopted the position that a conflict existed
between the predecessor of section 162 and the predecessor of section 1221.14
The pre-Corn Products cases thus allowed a deduction to the taxpayers by
14 6
finding the expenditure ordinary and necessary in the course of the business.
However, many taxpayers were denied ordinary treatment because business
1
purpose or necessity was lacking. 47
Corn Productsplaced the conflict between capital and ordinary treatment in
a new prospective. While rejecting the broadened interpretation of existing
statutory exclusions used by the Tax Court in Western Wine 48 and the Second
Circuit in Bagley and Corn Products,1 49 the United States Supreme Court expanded the ordinary and necessary business expense requirements to include an
"integrally related" test which converted capital income or loss into ordinary
income or loss. 1 ° The Corn Products decision made ordinary loss treatment

primarily for sale. Commissioner v. The Hub, Inc., 68 F.2d 349, 4 U.S. Tax Cas. f11,206 (4th
Cir. 1934), in which a subscription to the capital stock of a non-profit corporation designed to
draw industry to the area held to be an ordinary and necessary business expense.
140. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §23 (now I.R.C. §162).
141. The "necessity" notions have been applied in cases with analogous factual situations.
See Herbert Enoch, 57 T.C. 781 (1972) (necessary); Wilaka Builders, Inc. v. United States,
1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (not necessary).
142. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §177 (now I.R.C. §1221).
143. 221 F.2d at 947, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,381.
144. Edwards v. Hogg, 214 F.2d 640, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f9,485 (5th Cir. 1954), dealing
with the same American Distilling stock as in Western Wine, the loss from which was held to
be a business expense.
145. Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
146. Id. at 1150 ("reasonable and necessary act in the conduct of its business").
It is one thing to state that a purchase is necessary and another to state that it is vital.
Compare Electrical Fittings Corp., 33 T.C. 1026 (1960), ("vital source of supply"), with Helen
M. Livesley, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 024,061 (1960) (not necessary that "business would have been
crippled or would have failed").
147. See, e.g., Wilaka Builders, Inc. v. United States, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f9,519 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Fred Rosenthal, 48 T.C. 515 (1967); Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791 (1962); Gulftex Drug
Co., 29 T.C. 118, aff'd per euriam 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1968); Edward Koppelman, 27 T.C.
382, appealdismissed, 249 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1957).
148. See note 129 supra.
149. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewell, 221 F.2d 944, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,381 (2d Cir.
1955); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 395 (1951), aff'd 215 F.2d 513,
1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. V66,082 (2d Cir. 1954).
150. 350 U.S. at 50, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,746.
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more accessible to taxpayers. 151 At the same time, taxpayers continued to enjoy
success in the source of supply cases. 152 Losses incurred on the sale of securities
could be characterized under either section 162 or section 165. The section 162
argument advanced in Bagley in terms of an ordinary and necessary business
expense continued to be the basis for permitting non-capital treatment, 15 with
courts finding that the acquisition of the securities was a reasonable and necessary act in the conduct of the business. 154 But a problem developed in situations
where it was necessary to hold the securities over a period covering more than
one taxable year, preventing the determination of the amount of the deduction
in the year or years incurred. One solution would be to hold the transaction
"open" under Burnet v. Logan'5 5 notions until the amount is ascertained by a
sale. But because the measure of the business expense was also the measure of
the loss on the sale, a more straightforward approach is to allow a section 165
loss. Corn Products provided additional support for treating the loss as noncapital under section 165, rather than under an "open transaction' 56 approach
under section 162.
Typical of the post-Corn Products source of supply cases is Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States. 57 The reasoning in Booth is based on the same
section 162 notions that underlie the source of supply cases, but with additional
support drawn from the Corn Products rationale. The decision further exemplifies the court's indifference to whether section 162 or 165 controls the
deduction. From Booth emerged a rule that was actually a distillation of all the
cases which had preceded it:
[fjf securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integraland necessary
act in the conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until their
sale, any loss incurred as a result thereof may be fully deducted from
gross income as a business expense or ordinary loss. If on the other hand
an investment purpose be [sic] found to have motivated the purchase or
151. Until lately, Corn Products was the only case involving a sale at a gain. For recent
litigation involving gains, see, e.g., Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1343, 1975-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 19,800 (Ct. CI. 1975); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 69 T.C.
357 (1977); Bell Febre Products, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 134,263, appeal dismissed nolle prosequi,
(7th Cir. 1977).
152. See, e.g., Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 1961-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,138 (6th
Cir. 1960) (merchandise that would go to competitors); M.F.A. Cent. Cooperative v. Bookwalter, 286 F. Supp. 956, 1968-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,480 (E.D. Mo. 1968) (prerequisite to receive
loan); Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 434, 1961-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,605 (E.D. Wis.
1961) (newsprint); Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605, 1958-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 19,783 (E.D. Va. 1958) (line of ladies apparel); FS Services, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d
548, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,539 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (oil products); Electrical Fittings Corp., 33 T.C.
1026 (1960) (iron castings); Old Dominior Plywood Corp., 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 127,999 (1966)
(lumber core); Helen M. Livesley, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 924,061 (1960) (potatoes); Arlington
Bowling Corp., 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 1123,815 (1959) (scarce bowling pins).
153. Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewell, 221 F.2d 944, 946-47, 1955-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,381 at

54,884-85 (2d Cir. 1955).
154. Following the language in Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co., 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
155. 283 U.S. 404, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1736 (1931).
156. Id.
157. 303 F.2d 916, 1962-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,530 (Ct. Cl. 1962).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss1/3

22

Battaglia: Section 741 and Corn Products: A Logical Extension
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX1

holding of the securities, any loss realized upon their ultimate disposition must be treated in accord with the capital asset provision of the
Code.158
As was suggested by the Pallock dissent, 159 there seems to be no reason why
"partnership interest" could not be substituted for "securities" in the Booth
Newspapers rule. A partnership interest could just as easily be acquired to
obtain a source of supply for use in the production of income, and thereby
qualify as an ordinary (integral) and necessary expense.
Captive Market Cases
Business necessity continued to be the overriding consideration in obtaining
ordinary treatment for sales of securities, but Corn Products enabled taxpayers
to expand from a source of supply argument to a source of income rationale and
argue that stock was acquired to preserve or ensure a source of income to the
taxpayer.
The source of income cases can also be viewed in the ordinary and necessary
context of section 162, although the courts tend to lose sight of this basis for
their holdings. 60 The source of income cases are analogous to the shareholderemployee cases in which the taxpayer makes capital contributions or loans to
his corporation in order to preserve his source of income as an employee.' 6 ' In
fact, many of the source of income cases deal with the preservation of income as
an employee. 62 An early distinction by courts was drawn between perservation
or enhancement of existing income, 63 and investment in a new source of business income. 6 4 The business necessity concept has continuing vitalityles even as
158. Id. at 921, 1962-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,530 at 85,236-37 (emphasis added).
159. 69 T.C. at 142, 147.
160. See, e.g., Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1, 1970-I U.S. Tax Cas. ff9,328 (6th Cir.
1970) (to keep control away from insurgent stockholders who wished to terminate the taxpayer's employment); Hagan v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 248, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,701
(D. Ark. 1963) ("sole concern to protect and retain a valuable source . . ." of commissions);
Elmer Carsello, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1833,880 (1977) (purchase of stock to protect income from
financially troubled employer); Southeastern Aviation Underwriters Inc., 25 T.C.M. (CCH)
f27,908 (1966) (to replace principal source of management commissions); Weather-Seal Inc.,
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 9126,056 (1963) (directed toward holding on to existing business by attracting
quality employees).
161. For the last word in this area see United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 1972-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. f19,259.
162. See, e.g., Steadman v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 1, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f19,328 (6th Cir.
1970); Elmer Carsello, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 133,880 (1977); Wallace L. Hirsch, 30 T.C.M. (CCH)
1130,985 (1971).
163. See cases at note 160 supra.
164. See, e.g., Duffey v. Lethert, 1963-1 U.S. Tax Cas. U19,442 (D. Minn. 1963) (expenditure
to produce future income as opposed to retaining existing business); Chase Candy Co. v.
United States, 126 F. Supp. 521, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,703 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (capital outlay to
be recouped over a period of years); Edward Koppelman, 27 T.C. 382, appeal dismissed, 249
F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1957) (separate business venture entered); Pietro Caboara, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
34,686 (1977) (liquor license is an investment to permit engaging in liquor business as opposed to a recurring business expense).
165. See, e.g., Pietro Caboara, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1834,686 (1977).
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it merges with the business/investment test found in later cases. 166
A good statement of the rule enunciated in the source of income cases was
made in Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States.167 There, in order to retain
a principal account, a commission sales agent entered into an exclusive sales
contract conditioned upon the agent making a substantial investment in the
company. The Government argued that the expenditure not only preserved but
significantly expanded the taxpayer's business, but the Court of Claims held
that "[i]ncreased business may well flow from continued life, but an expenditure basically designed to insure continued life should not be denied its status
as an ordinary and necessary business expense simply because it may also possibly result in business enlargement."1 68 The Government's protection-expansion
argument was finally abandoned following another defeat in Schlumberger
Technology Corp. v. United States'6 9 in which the Fifth Circuit noted that the
means used to protect a business may very well be the same means used to expand a business.170 Thus, while a protection-expansion test would be easy to
apply, courts have recognized that the two purposes of protection and expansion can exist simultaneously.
The test in the source of income cases is the same as that in the source of
supply cases: whether or not the expenditure is an integral and necessary act
in the conduct of the business. 71 For this reason, as with the source of supply
166. Compare cases at note 164 supra, with Midland Distributors, Inc. v. United States,
481 F.2d 750, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,543 (5th Cir. 1973).
The outer extremity of the source of income cases appears to be Wallace L. Hirsch, 50
T.C.M. (CCH) 130,985 (1971), where an ordinary loss was allowed for an expenditure designed to preserve the taxpayer's trade or business of being a corporate executive. Id. Stock
and debentures were acquired according to the Tax Court as "an integral part of his trade or
business of being a corporate executive." Id. at 1013. At least one commentator is of the
opinion that Hirsch is authority for ordinary loss treatment on stock purchased for the purpose of entering into a new business. LeMaster, supra note 125, at 150 (1976).
Additional support for this view can be found in Pittsburgh Reflector Co., 27 T.C.M.
(CCH) 28,934 (1968), where the taxpayer acquired a Canadian subsidiary to both retain its
sales in the area and add new lines to its present distribution. The Court did not put a great
deal of emphasis on a "protection" or "necessity" theory when it said: "The losses on the
stock . . .were all incurred in the petitioner's attempt to increase and improve its regular
business ....
" Id. at 379. A distinction should be drawn, however, between a necessary expense to preserve an existing trade or business source of income as a corporate executiveemployee, and an expense incurred to engage in a new trade or business other than that of
being a corporate executive-employee. See, e.g., Southeastern Aviation Underwriters Inc., 25
T.C.M. (CCH) 27,908 (1966) where the trade or business being preserved was the management of insurance underwriting contracts, while the means of preserving it was to acquire a
new business of aviation insurance underwriting which would then provide a contract to be
managed.
167. 419 F.2d 845, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,718 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869
(1970).
168. Id. at 853, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,718 at 85,999. The court further noted that if
busines necessity does not exist and the motive is expansion, the expenditure is capital in
nature. Id.
169. 443 F.2d 1115, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,473 (5th Cir. 1971).
170. Id. at 1121, 1971-1 US. Tax Cas. 19,473 at 86,692.
171. See the rule in Booth Newspapers in the text accompanying note 158 supra.
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cases, the relationship of partnership interests to the source of income cases
should be considered.
The Mixed Motive Cases"72
The courts in Waterman, Largen and Schlumberger found the acquisition
of securities to be an integral and necessary act in the conduct of the business.
These decisions also signaled recognition of the possibility that an expenditure
which may be integral and necessary may also be an expenditure in the nature
of a capital investment. The Government was quick to find a new line of attack on the mixed business expense/capital investment expenditures. The same
day as Schlumberger was decided, the Court of Claims handed down its opinion
in Dearborn Co. v. United States.173 The issue in Dearborn was framed in the
usual business versus investment terms. However, the decision seized upon a
point suggested by the Fifth Circuit in Schlumberger, although unknown to the
Court of Claims, that a business motive may exist contemporaneously with an
investment motive.' 7 4 The court considered four factors which it found relevant
in determining whether the acquisition was a business expense or capital ex75
penditureY.
The court ultimately found that Dearborn had been "motivated
by a substantial investment purpose and intent" indicative of a capital investment rather than a business expenditure,' 76 although the court could as easily
have found that the lack of business necessity precluded finding that the business expense was ordinary and necessary.
The "substantial investment motive" test did not catch on immediately.'
In fact, the Commissioner ruled subsequent to Dearborn that dual motivation
17
cases would be determined on the basis of which motive predominates, 8

172. See generally Note, Taxpayer Motivation and the Corn Products Doctrine, 29 TAx
LAw. 660 (1976).
173. 444 F.2d 1145, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,478 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
174. 443 F.2d at 1121, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,692.
175. 444 F.2d at 1166, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,717. A manufacturing subsidiary of Dearborn was having lumber supply problems which it sought to cure by acquiring a mill with a
group of investors. The court found four motives for acquiring the stock. In order of importance they were: a) additional supply of materials to maintain and increase subsidiaries'
sales, b) dividend income, c) fees for managing the mill, and d) capital growth. Id. The latter
three reasons were held to be substantial reasons for the acquisition which constitute investment intent and purpose. Further, while the supply consideration was a business purpose, the
court emphasized the fact that no other source of supply was considered or sought after, and
that Dearborn purchased less than 10% of the mill's total output over a fifteen year period.
Id. at 1167, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,717-18.
176. 444 F.2d at 1169, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,478. Cf. I.R.C. §263 (no deduction allowed
for capital expenditures).
177. Rather it was Schlumberger that seemed to find more acceptance than Dearborn. See,
e.g., Chemplast, Inc., 60 T.C. 623 (1973), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974), which used
the "integrally related to the business" test in allowing ordinary loss treatment to an investment in a subsidiary which was found to be a necessary act in the conduct of the business. Id.
at 630-31.
178. Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 67.
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thereby adopting the dominant motive test propounded in Generes v. United
States.179
The Court of Claims advanced the "substantial investment intent" test
again in Agway, Inc. v. United States,1 80 but the rule was short-lived, if it ever
had life at all. The same day as Agway, another Corn Products issue was decided by the Court of Claims in Union Pac. R.R. v. United States."" In an
opinion reviewed by the full court, the court appeared to reject the Dearborn
rationale and hold that substantial investment intent will not preclude ordinary
treatment21 2 Union Pac. R.R. involved railroad subsidiaries acquired by the
taxpayer shortly after the corporation had been reorganized. The lines were
considered vital to the efficient operation of the company and the restoration of
its solvency. The court followed a Schiumberger integral and necessary act
approach18s to reach its result. "The rule that emerges from the cases is that
corporate stock which is held for a business purpose, that is, one intimately
related to the taxpayer's normal source of business income, is not a capital
asset." 18' The latter language, taken with the court's statement that the stock
could not "be treated as a mere investment unrelated to the business operations
of the plaintiff,"' 18 5 permits the inference that the court believed the pres 8 The language of the decision also
dominant motive to be business motive.1
raises the question whether the court applied the "necessary" notions of section
162. Although its focus was not on the necessity of the acquisition, the court
actually went beyond the necessity question and found that the railroads were
vital to the continued operation of the business.18 7 Thus, while relying heavily
on the integral or intimate relationship of the acquisition to business income,
the court appears also to have considered the expenditure necessary.
The Government continued to press the "substantial investment motive"
test, either undaunted by or unsure of the result in Union Pac. R.R. Its efforts
179. 405 U.S. 93, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 79,259 (1972). Generes dealt with competing business and investment motives in determining whether a bad debt resulted from the taxpayer's
business or investment activities.
180. 524 F.2d 1194, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 79,777 (Ct. Cl. 1975). This case is unusual in that
it was the Government asserting for the first time the application of the Corn Products doctrine to a gain. Id. at 1200-01, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,425. "The rule can be stated to be,
and we believe is, that Corn Products will be applied in this court to purchases of company
stock to obtain a source of supply, only if there is no substantial investment intent." Id. at
1201, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,426.
181. 524 F.2d 1343, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 79,800 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
182. Id. at 1359, 1588, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,556-37, 88,560-61 (Nichols, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 1357-58, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,536-57.
184. Id. at 1558, 1975-2 US. Tax Cas. at 88,556.
185. Id. at 1359, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,557. The literal Corn Products language would
read "integral" rather than "intimate:
186. Id., 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,557. It is possible to view the language of the court as
stating there was no investment motive, an insubstantial investment motive or that the investment motive did not predominate. The Tax Court believes it expressed the latter view,
W. W. Windle Co., 65 T.C. 694, 711 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 966 (1977), as do the commentators; see, e.g., Note, Taxpayer Motivation and
the Corn ProductsDoctrine,29 TAx LAw. 660 (1976).
187. See note 146 supra.
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were not without reward. In W. W. Windle Co. 88 a wool processor was suffering from decreased sales on account of numerous customers going out of the
textile manufacturing business. To stabilize and increase sales, Windle found
a mill which a feasibility study indicated was not a good investment except as
a captive customer. Individuals and businesses in the area of the mill subscribed, with Windle, to the capital stock of a new corporation organized to
operate the mill. No dividends were anticipated by the subscribers, although it
was expected that the equity would grow and the mill's continued existence
would be a source of business and profit for Windle. The court found that the
predominant motive for acquisition of the stock was to obtain a captive customer, or source of income. A secondary, though substantial, motive was to
make an investmentss9 In its search for the proper standard for ordinary treatment, the court noted that Dearborn and Agway apparently had been repudiated by Union Pac. R.R. 9 ° Thus, determining that the Court of Claims used a
predominant motive test,' 91 the Tax Court viewed the issue to be whether the
of a secondary inpredominant motive test is correct, or whether the presence
2
vestment motive would override the business purpose.1'
The Tax Court examined similar questions decided by the Supreme Court
in other areas of the law where competing motives have arisen. The first of
these cases, Malat v. Riddell,19 3 involved the definition of the word "primarily"
as it would be used to determine whether property was held for investment or
there held that "primarily" means "of first importance" or
for sale. The ' Court
"principally, 19 4 citing Corn Products to support its decision. 95 As in Windle,
the Government had argued that "substantial" was the proper test.' 98 The
Court flatly rejected this test, thus confirming the continuing vitality of the
Corn Productsdoctine.
The second dual motive case noted in Windle was Generes v. United
States. 97 Generes focused on the question of which motive, protection of the
taxpayer's trade or business of being an employee, or protection of the employee's investment in the business, had prompted the taxpayer to make loans
99
to his corporation. 9 The Court held that the dominant motive controlled,
188. 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
966 (1977).
189. Id. at 705.
190. Id. at 710-11.
191. Id. at 711.
192. Id. at 711-12.
193. 383 U.S. 569, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,317 (1966).
194. Id. at 572, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,671.
195. "The purpose of the statutory provision with which we deal is to differentiate between the 'profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business' on the one hand
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 . . .) and 'the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time' on the other. (Gillette Motor
Co., 364 U.S. 130, 134)." Id.
196. Id. at 571, 1966-I U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,671.
197. 405 U.S. 93, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f9,259 (1972).
198. See I.R.C. §166. At stake was the same ordinary versus capital treatment of the loss as
was presented in Windle.
199. 405 U.S. at 103, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 83,960.
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quoting a Second Circuit case as support: 200 "[B]oth motives - that of protecting the investment and that of protecting the salary - are inevitably involved,
and an inquiry whether employee status provides a significant motivation will
always produce an affirmative answer and result in a judgment for the taxpayer." 201 "Significant" as used in Generes and "substantial" as used in Malat
are more than likely synonomous. To be sure, they cannot be regarded as accurate measures of intent and any distinction between the two would be blurred
in their application. The use of a "substantial" instead of "predominant" test
apparently would, as stated in Generes, always produce an affirmative answer
and result in the capital characterization generally advanced by the Government. The Tax Court nonetheless adopted the "substantial investment motive"
test holding that "stock purchased with a substantial investment purpose is a
capital asset even if there is a more substantial business motive for the purchase." 202 To make the Government's victory complete, the Tax Court disregarded prior case law to the contrary and held that a change in purpose will
be ignored.204
Since the decision in Windle, the "substantial investment purpose" test has
been strictly adhered to by the Tax Court, 205 once over the Government's objection.200 In every case, investment intent has been easily found.207 The test

enunciated by the Windle Court has made two drastic changes in law. First,
the rule which had been developed in the source of supply and source of income
cases, as carried forward in the early mixed motive cases, has been rendered irrelevent. By focusing on the investment intent, the question of whether or not
the expenditure was integral and necessary to the continued operation of the
business is never considered. Thus, the source of supply or source of income
acquired may be vital to the business but still be a capital investment if the
200. Id. at 104, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,960.
201. Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,112 (2d Cir. 1963).
202. 65 T.C. at 712.
203. See, e.g., Missisquoi Corp., 37 T.C. 791 (1962); Gulftex Drug Co., 29 T.C. 118, aff'd
per curiam, 261 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1958). Cf. Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d
916, 921, 1962-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,530 at 85,237 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (intentions of taxpayer at time of
acquisition and disposition are considered).
204. 65 T.C. at 713-14.
205. See Continental IMl. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 69 T.C. 357 (1977); Eastate of John F.
Capell, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 34,769 (1977); Bell Fibre Prod. Corp., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 34,263
(1977); Datamation Serv., Inc., 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 33,973 (1976).
206. See Bell Fibre Prod. Corp., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 34,263 (1977). Oddly enough, without
the Windle decision, the Government would have scored its first victory in asserting the application of the Corn Products doctrine to a gain on the sale of securities. The Tax Court
found a predominant business motive with a secondary, substantial investment motive. The
Government first argued that there was no investment motive. However, as suggested by the
quote from Generes, accompanying note 208 infra, the Tax Court had no problem in arriving
at an affirmative conclusion regarding investment motive. The Government then asked the Tax
Court to repudiate Windle and adopt the predominant motive test of Rev. Rul. 75-13, 1975-1
C.B. 67. (Rev. Rul. 75-13 has subsequently been revoked by the Service, Rev. Rul. 78-94,
1978-1 C.B. 58). The Court predictably refused to reverse itself and found the stock to be a
capital asset. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 188-89.
207. See cases cited note 205 supra.
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taxpayer in any way considers the expenditure from the standpoint of an
investor.

Secondly, the Tax Court has upheld a decision which is contrary to the
holdings in two analogous Supreme Court cases that employ a predominant
motive test.20

The use of different tests for the determination of intent in

comparable fact situations has already caused confusion. 20 9 In H.L. Davenport21° the taxpayer purchased stock from unrelated shareholders and made
loans to the same corporation "inorder to protect his main source of income
and employment ' 211 as president of the corporation.2 1 2 Both the taxpayer and
the government were confused as to the applicable law, arguing that the taxpayer's predominant motive controlled. 21 The Tax Court pointed out their
mutual error in a footnote2-4 and applied the Generes dominant motive test to
the loans and the Windle substantial investment motive test to the stock. Thus,
two different tests were applied to a single taxpayer motive to find that both
transactions were capital in nature.21 5 The Davenport decision demonstrates the

uncertainty created by the Tax Court's deviation in Windle from established
precedent and the inconsistency of the substantial motive test.
The difficult "substantial investment purpose" test merely restricts the applicability of the Corn Products doctrine rather than preventing its expansion
into new areas, expansion the Tax Court feared would result from the "predominant motive" test.216 No doubt many of the cases that have preceded
Windle would go the opposite way if examined in light of the Windle standard.
While the Corn Products doctrine is still valid, it seemingly will be applied
only to cases in which a source of supply or income is needed, and practically
no consideration will be given to the investment aspects of the expenditure.
The same business versus investment motive could of course arise with respect to a partnership interest. In Pollack for example, Pollack could reason208. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 119,259 (1972); Malat v.
Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff9,317 (1966).
209. H.L. Davenport, [1978] 86 REG. DEC. (CCH) 3345 (Sept. 14, 1978).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 3352.
212. The purchase of the stock fits into the "source of income" mold. See cases at note 120
supra, and accompanying text. The loans are typical of the Generes §166 situation. See text
accompanying note 197 supra.
213. [1978] 86 REG. DEC. (CCH) at 3352.
214. Id. at 3352 n.6.
215. While the motive was claimed to be the same by the taxpayer, [1978] 86 RrE. DEC.
(CCH) at 3352, the respective transactions occurred at different points in time. The latter fact
apparently was not relevant to the court, which made no mention of the timing.
216. 65 T.C. at 712-13. The Court's fear appears to have been misplaced. The first reason
offered in support of its holding was that Corn Products would have expanded application
into new areas. Id. As with all judicial doctrines, the courts have for the last 25 years probed
and defined the outer limits of the doctrine. The Windle decision very nearly renders the past
decisions useless by disregarding the business necessity test. The second basis for its holding is
that it believes the Supreme Court tacitly supports an "exclusion equivalence" test because the
corn futures in Corn Products were the equivalent of inventory which is a specific statutory
exclusion from the definition of section 1221. Id. The Supreme Court gives no indication that
this is its position. Indeed, its frequent use of Corn Products to demonstrate congressional
intent to exclude normal business income from capital gain treatment indicates the contrary.
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ably have been interested in both a source of income and capital appreciation
of his interest from the successful operation of the partnership. Thus, while
the source of supply and source of income cases could be applied to a partnership interest, the mixed motive cases and Windle should also have application.
Like the securities cases, then, the substantial investment motive test would no
doubt apply to a partnership interest. Whether or not the Court of Claims adheres to a predominant motivation standard remains to be seen. If it does,
forum shopping could provide the seller of a partnership interest with ordinary
deduction or loss treatment much more easily than could be obtained in the
Tax Court.
TIE EXTENSION OF THE CORN PRODUCTS Doanmm
To OTnm PROVISIONS
217
GRANTING CONSTRUarIVE CAPITAL ASSET TREATmENT

The extension of the Corn Productsdoctrine to partnership interests based
upon the similarities between such interests and securities is grounded more on
logic and analogy than on case law. But court decisions can be looked to to determine whether the same judicial exceptions that apply to section 1221 would
also apply to other provisions which grant a constructive capital asset status. As
noted, the courts use the same section 1221 rules of construction and interpretation to determine whether section 741 applies to the facts of each case.218 The
question remains then whether the same judicial exceptions to section 1221
should apply to section 741.
An analogous situation is the extention of the Corn Products doctrine to
section 1231, another provision granting constructive capital asset status.=
Application of the Corn Productsdoctrine was limited until recently to capital
assets defined in section 1221, but section 1231 was an area ripe for expansion.
217.
218.
219.
SEC.

See, Javaras supranote 125; Rabinovitz & Shashy, supra note 125.
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
I.R.C. §1231 provides in pertinent part:
1231. Property used in the trade or business and involuntary conversions.

(a) General Rule. -If,
during the taxable year, the recognized gains on sales or exchanges of property used in the trade or business, plus the recognized gains from the compulsory or involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction in whole or in part, theft or
seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or the threat or imminence thereof) of property used in the trade or business and capital assets held for more
than I year into other property or money, exceed the recognized losses from such sales,
exchanges, and conversions, such gains and losses shall be considered as gains and
losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than 1 year. If such gains do
not exceed such losses, such gains and losses shall not be considered as gains and losses from
sales or exchanges of capital assets ....
(b) Definition of Property Used in the Trade or Business. - For purposes of this section (1) General rule. -The term "property used in the trade or business" means property
used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, held for more than 1 year, and real property used in the trade
or business, held for more than I year, which is not (A) property of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the
taxpayer if on hand at the dose of the taxable year,
(B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business.... (emphasis added).
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The application of Corn Products to section 1231 could only benefit the Government because taxpayers already enjoyed capital treatment on gains and
ordinary treatment on losses. 220 The expansion of the Corn Products doctrine
to section 1231 is limited to gains from the sale of property used in the trade or
business, because involuntary conversions cannot possibly be a normal source of
business income.221
2
Like sections 1221 and 741, the object of section 1231 is taxpayer relief.22
3
Prior to the enactment of what is now section 1231,225 taxpayers received ordinary treatment on the sale or exchange of business property224 only to permit
the full benefit of a loss. This, however, put a burden on businesses disposing
of appreciated property at a gain.225 To encourage sales of business property,
Congress provided preferential treatment to taxpayers by granting capital treat226
ment on gains from the sale of business property.
The possibility of applying Corn Products to section 1231 was alluded to in
several cases. 227 The first case to address this issue was Deltide Fishing Rental
Tools, Inc. v. United States.228 In Deltide, the taxpayer was engaged in the
business of leasing tools. Charges at slightly more than original cost were made
for damaged or lost tools. The court was reluctant to apply the Corn Products
doctrine to the conversions of the leased tools 229 even though such an extension
might have been suggested by the Supreme Court. 230 The court distinguished
220. I.R.C. §1231(a).
221. See Rev. Rul. 75-34, 1975-1 C.B. 271, revoking Rev. Rul. 58-77, 1958-1 C.B. 118 to the
contrary. See also Grant Oil Tool Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 389, 1967-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9,573 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Philadelphia Quartz Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 512, 1967-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. ff9,304 (Ct. Cl. 1976); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904,
1961-1 U.S. Tax Gas. g19,359 (Ct. Cl. 1961). The ruling and cases dealt with forfeited deposits
on unreturned containers in which the companies' products were sold. A possible explanation
for the refusal to apply Corn Products to the cases, even though it was recognized that Corn
Products may be applicable in some §1231 situations, is that the sales were involuntary within
the meaning of §§1231 and 1033.
222. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 372, 415.
223. Irr. REv. CODE or 1939, §117(j)(2) (now I.R.C. §1231).
224. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, only depreciable personal property received such
treatment. Amendments to the House bill by the Senate extended the preferential treatment
to all depreciable business property and real property used in the trade or business. See S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 49 (1942), 1942-2 C.B. 504, 545-46.
225. Id., 1942-2 C.B. at 545-46.
226. It is interesting to note that one of the fears of the Tax Court in W. W. Windle Co.,
65 T.C. 694, 713-14 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966
(1977), was that the predominant motivation test would cause the treatment of Corn Productstype property to be treated the same as property under §1231. This fear does not appear wellfounded. Both §1231 and Corn Products property are closely (or integrally) related to the
normal production of income by the business. Property acquisitions which tend to retain and
increase the income flow from the business should be encouraged, and dispositions of property
which tend to stem the tide of revenue should not be penalized. The Government's position
certainly does not act as an incentive to business expansion which would proportionately increase the tax base.
227. See the revenue ruling and cases cited note 221 supra.
228. 279 F. Supp. 661, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19188 (E.D. La. 1968).
229. Id. at 664, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,294.
230. Id. at 666, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 86,295-96 (citing Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transport Co., 364 U.S. 130, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9,556 (1960).
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Corn Products, concluding that while the corn futures were closely related to
inventory, the rental tools were an investment in Deltide's total business
operation.Ui
In Continental Can Co. v. United States,23 2 the Court of Claims followed
the Corn Products doctrine without directly stating its reliance. 233 Continental
Can involved a manufacturer of can dosing machines who held the machines
both for sale and for lease. The issue revolved around the definition of "prop234
erty held... primarily for sale... in the ordinary course ... of business."
The court first held that the primary purpose is determined at the time of
sale.235 But the court went on to hold that the word "primarily" does not
modify just the words "for sale," thereby contrasting selling with renting, but
rather modifies "for sale in the ordinary course of his trade or business," drawing a distinction between sales inside and outside the normal course of the
business. 230 This interpretation of the statutory language precluded the machines from coming within the definition of property used in the trade or
business by fitting them into the section 1231(b)(1)(B) exclusion. Thus, reliance
on Corn Productsand the creation of an exception to the statute was unnecessary. But the Corn Products doctrine does support the notions that the constructive definition of a capital asset under section 1231 should be narrowly
construed, and the exclusions thereto should be broadly construed to prevent a
2 37
normal source of business income from receiving preferential treatment.
The First Circuit likewise tacitly relied on Corn Products to reach a similar
result in InternationalShoe Machine Corp. v. United States.238 In that case a
shoe machine manufacturer leased machines to customers, but would sell the
equipment on request. The inquiry again focused on the application of the
23 9
phrase "held... primarily for sale ...in the ordinary course ...of business."
24
240
The court did not find Malat v. Ridde1 dispositive of the issue at hand. "
231. 279 F. Supp. at 669, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,297-98. It could be argued that the
proceeds realized were from involuntary conversions which, although anticipated and accepted,
were not a normal source of business income. See text accompanying note 221 supra.
232. 422 F.2d 405, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,243 (CL Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
233. See Rabinovitz &Shashy, supra note 125, at 972 n.51.
234. See I.R.C. §1231(b)(1)(B), quoted note 219 supra.
235. 422 F.2d at 410, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 82,959.
236. Id. at 410-11, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 82,959-60. As authority for the distinction, the
court cited Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 2]9,121 (Ct. Cl.
1963). Recordak, in short, dealt with the question of which prepositional phrases modified
which verbs so that it could be determined which phrase was modified by the adverb "primarily." A confusing English lesson at best.
237. Such an interpretation and application of Corn Products to the case would be in
keeping with the Supreme Court's use of Corn Products in Malat v. Riddell, 383 US. 569,
1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,817 (1966), to demonstrate that property producing income in the
ordinary course of business would fall within the definition of the phrase "held for sale in the
ordinary course of business." See I.R.C. §1231(b)(1)(B).
238. 491 F.2d 157, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,200 (1st Cir. 1974), aff'g, 369 F. Supp. 588, 1973-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9,774 (D. Mass. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
239. I.R.C. §1231(b)(1)(B), quoted note 219 supra.

240. 383 U.S. 569, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f9,317 (1966).
241. 491 F.2d at 159-60, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,317. The court determined that Malat
dealt with the distinction of whether property was held for sale or investment, while the in-
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Instead, the court found that the sales of the machines generated income in the
"ordinary course of... business," 242 based upon the district court's conclusion
243
Thus,
that the sales were "an accepted and predictable part of the business."
definithe
from
exclusion
statutory
the decision, though applying the specific
tion of property used in the trade of business, 244 implicitly relied upon the
Corn Products "integral part of its business" 245 and "normal source of business
income" 246 rationales.
The only case to create a judicial exception to section 1231 by extension of
the Corn Products doctrine has been Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner.2 47 In Hollywood Baseball, the taxpayer was a minor league baseball club
which in order to participate in the league had to agree to sell its baseball
player contracts upon demand. At issue was the characterization of gain from
such sales. The Ninth Circuit refused to strain the definitional exclusions of
section 1231, and found that the club held the contracts for the purpose of
and not to sell them. Thus, the contracts were not held
playing baseball
"principally"2 48 for sale to customers.2 49 The court relied on the Corn Products
doctrine to create an exception to the definition of property used in the trade
or business in section 123 1,25 holding that Corn Products could be applied to
stant case dealt with sales in the ordinary as opposed to extraordinary course of business. Id.,
1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,317.
242. Id. at 160, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 83,317-18.
243. Id., 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,317-18. See 369 F. Supp. 588, 593, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
19,774 at 82,513 (D. Mass. 1973), for the district court's discussion of the occasional sales which
were an accepted part of the taxpayer's business. Although the district court frequently made
reference to Corn Products as an interpretive guide for the phrase at issue, the court did not
specifically enunciate the Corn Products principles. Corn Products came into the picture in a
rather unusual manner. Realizing that in Malat the Supreme Court cited Corn Products to
demonstrate the purpose and reach of the phrase "primarily for sale in the ordinary course of
business" as an exclusionary provision, and further realizing that the income at issue was
within the bounds defined in Malat, the taxpayer argued that the principles of Corn Products
applied only to §1221. Id. at 592-93, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 82,512-13. The district court rejected this argument stating that "the general principles enumerated in Corn Products would
be significant in any case where there is a question whether a business disposition of its
products is to be accorded capital gain or ordinary income treatment." Id. at 593, 1973-2 U.S.
Tax Gas. at 82,512. It is interesting that the Supreme Court in Malat used the general principles of a case creating a judicial exception to a statute for defining the limits of a statutory
exclusion from the same definition of a capital asset. It can be said that while the integral part
of the business test enlisted a juidicial exception to the statute, the general principle of the
Corn Products case that a normal source of business income is not to receive capital treatment
pervades all exclusions from the definition of a capital asset, both judicial and statutory. The
district and circuit court both utilized the Corn Products principles to bring the sales within
the confines of the statutory exclusion.
244. 491 F.2d at 160, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,317-18. The sales were thus brought within
the exclusionary provisions of I.R.C. §1231(b)(1)(B).
245. 550 U.S. at 50, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 56,063.
246. Id. at 52, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 56,064.
247. 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970).
248. Id. at 495, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 82,999, borrowing the definition of "primarily"
from Malat.
249. Id., 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 82,999.
250. Id. at 497, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,000. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Tax
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depreciable assets.251 In rejecting the contrary authority of Deltide Fishing
Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 25 2 that Corn Products did not apply to
section 1231, the court stated
Whether property comes under §1221 (and is therefore defined as a
capital asset) or whether it comes under §1231 (and is therefore treated
as a capital asset even though it is excluded from the §1221 definition)
should make no difference, because the policy is the same - not to give
preferential treatment to25 3profits and losses arising from the everyday
operation of the business.
The Hollywood Baseball decision did much the same thing for section 1231
property as Corn Products did for section 1221 property: each carved out a
specific judicial exception in lieu of expanding the reach of the exclusionary
provisions by straining the statutory language. The court in Hollywood Baseball expressed probably the best reason for not elasticizing the statutory exclusion when, in speaking about the same "primarily for sale" language found
in section 337, the court stated that "the Corn Products doctrine, although in
some way related to the concept behind 'primarily for sale,' is actually independent of it."'Although the Corn Products doctrine was extended to section 1231 by
Hollywood Baseball, litigation on the subject has been sparse since the First
Circuit's decision in InternationalShoe. A possible explanation is that between
the application of the Corn Products doctrine by the Ninth Circuit and the use
of Corn Products principles by the Tenth Circuit and Court of Claims to expand the statutory exclusions, the Government appears to be firmly in control
in the dual purpose area of section 1231. It is significant in light of Windle
that in each of the cases discusssed there existed a dual purpose, use or sale for
the acquisition of the property. The sales may not have been desired, but, unlike the sales in Deltide,2 5 they could not be said to be involuntary. The income in the ordinary course of business/conversion of a business investment
dichotomy apparently is analogous to dual business and investment purposes
that are encountered with section 1221.
The overriding significance of the section 1231 cases, and Hollywood Baseball in particular, is two-fold. First, the cases leading up to the ultimate creation of an exception to section 1231 follow much the same pattern as the Corn
Productsline of cases with section 1221 and the cases establishing the anticipatory assignment of income exception to section 741.256 In each instance the
Court had merged the "primarily" test of Malat with the "integrally related" test of Corn

Products. That such a merger was made or intended by the Tax Court is open to question.
See note 243 supra. It is possible that, as suggested in note 243 supra, the Tax Court used
Corn Products notions to expand the statutory exclusion of §1231(b)(l)(B) enabling it to fit
player contracts within the expanded provision.
251. 423 F.2d at 499-500, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,001-02.
252. 279 F. Supp. 661, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 59,188 (E.D. La. 1968).
253. 423 F.2d at 498, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,001.

254. Id. at 499, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,002.
255. See note 221 supra.
256. See United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
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courts were inclined and made every effort to stay within the confines of the
statutory exceptions to capital asset treatment. Only when it was apparent that
strict adherance to the statute was not possible did the courts create a judicial
exception. No doubt the same procedure could again be employed to extend
the Corn Products doctrine to section 741. Secondly, the Ninth Circuit in
Hollywood Baseball made an important statement that whether property is
defined as a capital asset or simply treated as a capital asset makes no difference
because the policy against preferential treatment for income from normal business operations is the same. 257 The policy against capital treatment of gains or
losses from normal business operations was first enunciated in Corn Products.
Thus, statutes with a common purpose and policy background should logically
have the same judicial exceptions applied to them in order to effectuate Congressional intent. This has been done with sections 1221 and 741 with the
anticipatory assignment of income principles, and sections 1221 and 1231 with
the Corn Products doctrine, and the same should be done with section 741.
CONCLUSION

The analysis of the Pollack decision and the Corn Productsdoctrine leads to
the likely conclusion that the Corn Products doctrine should be applied to
section 741. The Tax Court reached the proper conclusion in finding that
section 741 is independent of section 1221 and therefore a partnership interest
is not a section 1221 capital asset to which the Corn Products doctrine could be
applied. Yet, while not reaching the issue of whether Corn Products is an exception to section 741, the Tax Court seemed to preclude such a conclusion by
holding that the "shall be considered" language of section 741 is mandatory.
Unlike the Congressional mandate for the section 1235 provisions, however, the
legislative history of section 741 does not dictate the court's interpretation.
Moreover, the Tax Court itself has indicated that the language is not mandatory by judicially creating an anticipatory assignment of income exception to
section 741.
By analogy to securities, the predominant type of property to which the
Corn Products doctrine has been applied, the source of supply, source of income and mixed motive cases can easily and reasonably be applied to section
741 partnership interests. Although the Windle decision has seriously restricted
the use of Corn Products, the doctrine as restricted should nonethelsss be employed.
Furthermore, the extension of the Corn Products doctrine to section 1231
indicates that statutory provisions with the same purpose and policy considerations should whenever appropriate be subjected to the same judicial exceptions.
It follows that the Corn Productsdoctrine should be applied to section 741.
WILum P. BATTAGLIA
1963); Roth v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 607, 1963-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff9,656

(9th Cir. 1963);

Herman M. Hale, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) ff27,590 (1965). See also discussion beginning at text accompanying note 85 supra.

257.

See note 253 supra and accompanying text.
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